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IV.—THE CONCEPTION" OF EEALITY. 
By G-. E. MOORE. 
THE fourth chapter of Mr. Bradley's Appearance and Reality 
is a chapter headed "Space and Time," and he begins the 
chapter as follows :— 
" The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to 
discuss fully the nature of space or of time. It will content 
itself with stating our main justification for regarding them as 
appearances. I t will explain why we deny that, in the character 
which they exhibit, they either have or belong to reality."* 
Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his 
opinion, Time, in a certain character, neither has nor belongs 
to reality ; this is the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And 
to say that Time has not reality would seem to be plainly 
equivalent to saying that Time is not real. However, if 
anybody should doubt whether the two phrases are meant to 
be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by a 
reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where 
Mr. Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: 
" Time," he says, " like space, has most evidently proved not to 
be real, but to be a contradictory appearance" (p. 43). 
Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, in so many words, that 
Time is not real. But there is one other difference between 
this statement at the end of the chapter, and the statement at 
the beginning of it, which we must not forget to notice. In 
the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the 
assertion " Time neither has nor belongs to reality " by saying 
* Appearance and Reality (2nd edn.), p. 35. The italics are mine. 
 by guest on June 7, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
102 G. E. MOOIiE. 
" Time, in the character which it exhibits, neither has nor 
belongs to reality," whereas in the final statement this 
qualification is not inserted; here he says simply " Time is 
not real." This qualification, which is inserted in the one 
place and omitted in the other, might, of course, be meant to 
imply that, in some other character—some character which it 
does not exhibit—Time has reality and does belong to it. And 
I shall presently have something to say about this distinction 
between Time in one character and Time in another, because it 
might be thought that this distinction is the explanation of the 
difficulty as to Mr. Bradley's meaning, which I am going to 
point out. 
However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds that 
in some sense, at all events, the whole proposition " Time is nob 
real" can be truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a 
passage in which he says things which, at first sight, seem 
difficult to reconcile with this view. This new passage is a 
passage in which he is not talking of Time in particular, but of 
" appearances" in general. But, as we have seen, he does 
regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no 
doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances 
is meant to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage 
is as follows :—* 
" For the present," he says, " we may keep a fast hold upon 
this, that appearances exist. That is absolutely certain, and to 
deny it is nonsense. And whatever exists must belong to 
reality. That is also quite certain, and its denial once more is 
self-contradictory. Our appearances, no doubt, may be a 
beggarly show, and their nature to an unknown extent may 
be something which, as it is, is not true of reality. That is one 
thing, and it is quite another thing to speak as if these facts 
had no actual existence, or as if there could be anything but 
reality to which they might belong. And I must venture to 
* Op. cit. pp. 131-2. 
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THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY. 103 
repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense. What 
appears, for that sole reason, most indubitably i s ; and there is 
no possibility of conjuring its being away from it." 
That is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty 
as to his meaning when contrasted with the former passage. 
And the reason why it seems to me to raise one is this. In the 
former passage Mr. Bradley declared most emphatically that 
Time is not real; he said: " Time has most evidently proved 
not to be real." Whereas in this one he seems to declare 
equally emphatically that Time does exist, and is. And his 
language here again is as strong as possible. He says it is 
sheer nonsense to suppose that Time does not exist, is not a 
fact, does not belong to reality. I t looks, therefore, as if he 
meant to make a distinction between " being real" on the one 
hand, and " existing," " being a fact," and " being" on the 
other hand—as if he meant to say that a thing may exist, and 
be, and be a fact, and yet not be real. And I think there is, at 
all events, some superficial difficulty in understanding this 
distinction. We might naturally think that to say " Time 
exists, is a fact, and is," is equivalent to saying that it is real. 
What more, we might ask, can a man who says that Time is 
real meau to maintain about it than that it exists, is a fact, and 
is ? All that most people would mean by saying that Time is 
real could, it would seem, be expressed by saying " There is such 
a thing as Time." And it might, therefore, appear from this new 
passage as if Mr. Bradley fully agreed with the view that most 
people would express by saying "Time is real"—as if he did 
not at all mean to contradict anything that most people believe 
about Time. But, if so, then what are we to make of his 
former assertion that, nevertheless, Time is not real ? He 
evidently thinks that, in asserting this, he is asserting 
something which is not mere nonsense; and he certainly would 
not have chosen this way of expressing what he means, unless 
he had supposed that wlrit he is here asserting about Time is 
incompatible with what people often mean when they say 
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104 G. E. MOORE. 
" Time is real." Yet, we have seen that he thinks that what 
he is asserting is not incompatible with the assertions that 
Time is, and is a fact, and exists. He must, therefore, think 
that when people say " Time is real" they often, at least, mean 
something more than merely that there is such a thing as Time, 
something, therefore, which may be denied, without denying 
this. All the same, there is, I think, a real difficulty in seeing 
that they ever do mean anything more, and, if they do, what 
more it is that they can mean. 
The two expressions " There is such a thing as so and so " 
and "So and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite 
naturally used as equivalents, even if they are not always so 
used. And Mr. Bradley's own language implies that this is so. 
For, as we have seen, in the first passage, he seems to identify 
belonging to reality with being real. The conclusion which he 
expresses in one place by saying that Time does not belong to 
reality he expresses in' another by saying that it is not real; 
whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the meaning 
of the same phrase " belonging to reality" with existing; 
he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and 
that it is self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being 
real and existing are identical with' belonging to reality, it 
would seem they .must be identical with one another. And, 
indeed, in another passage in the Appendix to the 2nd Edition 
(p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using the following 
words: "Anything," he says, " that in any sense is, qualifies the 
absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have seen, he 
declares it to be nonsense to deny that Time is; he must, therefore, 
allow that, in a sense, at all events, it is nonsense to deny, that 
Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has made. 
Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the 
word " real" may, sometimes at all events, be properly used as 
equivalent to the words " exists," " is a fact," " is." And yet his 
two assertions cannot both be true, unless there is some sense 
in which the whole proposition " Time is real" is not equivalent 
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THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY. 105 
to and cannot be inferred from " Time is," or " Time exists," or 
" Time is a fact." 
I t seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be 
holding that the statement " Time is real " is, in one sense, not 
equivalent to " Time exists "; though he admits that, in another 
sense, it is. And I will only quote one other passage which 
seems to make this plain. 
" If," he says later on (p. 206) " Time is not unreal, I admit 
that our Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will 
be urged that time cannot be mere appearance. The change 
in the finite subject, we are told, is a matter of direct experience; 
it is a fact, and hence it cannot be explained away. And so 
much of course is indubitable. Change is a fact and, further, 
this fact, as such, is not reconcilable with the Absolute. And, if 
we could not in any way perceive how the fact can be unreal, 
we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless dilemma . . . But 
our real position is very different from this. For time has been 
shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With this, 
its discord, we see at once, may pass as an element into a wider 
harmony. And, with this, the appeal to fact at once becomes 
worthless." 
" I t is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to 
experience can prove reality. That I find something in existence 
in the world or in my self, shows that this something exists, and 
it cannot show more. Any deliverance of consciousness— 
whether original or acquired—is but a deliverance of conscious-
ness. I t is in no case an oracle and a revelation which we 
have to accept. I t is a fact, like other facts, to be dealt with; 
and there is no presumption anywhere that any fact is better 
than appearance." 
Here Mr. Bradley seems plainly to imply that to be " real" 
is something more and other than to be a fact or to exist. This 
is the distinction which I think he means to make, and which, 
I think, is the real explanation of his puzzling language, and 
this is the distinction which I ain going presently to discuss. 
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106 G. E. MOOKE. 
But I want first to say something as to that other distinction, 
which I said might be supposed to be the explanation of the 
whole difficulty—the distinction implied by the qualification 
" Time, in the character which it exhibits "; the suggestion that, 
when we talk of " Time," we may sometimes mean Time in one 
character, sometimes in another, and that what is true of it in 
the one character may not be true of it in the other. I t might, 
I think, be suggested that this is the explanation of the whole 
difficulty. And I want briefly to point out why I think it 
cannot be the only explanation. 
Stated very baldly and rudely, the difficulty which 
requires explanation is this: Mr. Bradley says, " I t is sheer 
nonsense to say Time is not real." But this thing which he 
says it is sheer nonsense to say is the very thing which he 
himself had formerly said. He had said, "Time has most 
evidently proved not to be real." Now, Mr. Bradley certainly 
does not mean to say that this proposition of his own is sheer 
nonsense; and yet he says, in words, that it is sheer nonsense. 
This is the difficulty. What is the explanation ? Quite 
obviously, the explanation can only take one possible form. 
Mr. Bradley must be holding that the words " Time is real" 
may have two different senses. In one sense, the denial of them 
is sheer nonsense; in the other sense, so far from being sheer 
nonsense, denial of them is, according to him, evidently true. 
Now, what are these two different senses, between which the 
difference is so enormous ? It is here that the two different 
explanations come in. 
The first and, as I think, the wrong explanation (though I 
think Mr. Bradley's words do give some colour to it) is 
this. I t might be said: " The whole business is perfectly easy 
to explain. When Mr. Bradley says that Time is not real, 
what he means is that Time, in the character which it exhibits, 
is not real. Whereas, when he says, Time does exist, is a fact, 
and is, and that it is nonsense to deny this, what he means is 
that Time does exist, in some otlier character—some character 
 by guest on June 7, 2016
http://aristotelian.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY. 107' 
other than that which it exhibits. He does not mean to make 
any distinction, such as you suppose between two meanings of 
the word 'real'—the one of them merely equivalent to 
' exists,'' is/ ' is a fact,' and the other meaning something very 
different from this. The only distinction he means to make is 
a distinction between two meanings of ' Time' or of the whole 
sentence ' Time is real.' He distinguishes between the meaning 
of this sentence, when it means ' Time, in the character which 
it exhibits, is real,' which meaning, he says, is evidently false; 
and its meaning when it means, ' Time, in some other character, 
is real,' and this meaning, he says, is evidently true. This is 
the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle, which is, in 
fact, therefore, very easy to solve." 
This, I think, might be offered as an explanation of Mr. 
Bradley's meaning. And it must be admitted that it would 
furnish a complete explanation of the particular puzzle I have 
just stated, it would completely absolve Mr. Bradley from the 
charge of inconsistency; and would show that where he appears 
to contradict himself about the reality of Time, the contradic-
tion is verbal only and not real. We might, indeed, object to 
this distinction between Time in one character and Time in 
another; on the ground that anything which has not got the 
character which Time exhibits, but only some other character, 
ought not to be called Time at all. We are, indeed, perfectly 
familiar with the conception that one and the same thing may 
at one time possess a character which it does not possess at 
another, so that what is true of it at one time may not be true 
of it at another. We are, that is, familiar with the idea of a 
thing changing its character. But Time itself as a whole 
obviously cannot change its character in this sense. Mr. Bradley 
cannot mean to say that it possesses the character " which it 
exhibits " and in which it is unreal at one tim.e, and possesses 
some other character, in which it is real, at some other time.. 
And hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if 
Time itself could have two incompatible characters; since 
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108 G. E. MOORE. 
nothing can have two incompatible characters, unless it has 
them at different times. And this is an objection which does 
seem, to apply to Mr. Bradley's doctrine in any case, since he 
does in any case seem to imply this distinction between Time 
in one character and Time in another, whether this distinction 
is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or not. 
Yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objec-
tion to Mr. Bradley's words; it would not necessarily be an 
objection to his meaning. Where he seems to imply that Time, 
in some character other than that which it exhibits, may be 
fully real, he may only mean that something completely different 
from Time, but which does in some sense correspond to it, is 
fully real; and if he does mean this, our objection would only 
-amount to an objection to his giving the name of " Time " to 
this supposed counterpart of Time ; we might say, and I think 
justly, that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of 
Time as if it were Time itself in some other character; but 
this would go no way at all to show that there may not really 
be such a counterpart of Time, which is real, while Time itself 
is unreal. We might ask, too, what this supposed counterpart of 
Time is like, or (to put it in Mr. Bradley's way) what the 
precise character is, in which Time is real ? And I think 
Mr. Bradley would admit that he cannot tell us. But this, 
you see, would also be no objection to his actual doctrine. He 
might quite well know, and be right in saying, that there is 
and must be a real counterpart of Time, completely different in 
•character from Time, as we know it, even though he has not 
the least idea what this counterpart is like. 
We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation 
of our puzzle would be a complete explanation of it. I t would 
completely vindicate Mr. Bradley from the charge of incon-
sistency, and would give us, as his doctrine, a doctrine to which 
we have hitherto found no objection except verbal ones. 
But, nevertheless, I think it is a wrong explanation, and I 
want to explain why. If we were to suppose that this distinc-
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THE CONCEPTION OF HEALITY. 1 0 9 
tion between Time in one character and Time in another were 
the only one on which Mr. Bradley meant to rely, we should 
have as his doctrine this: We should have to suppose him to 
affirm most emphatically that Time, in the character which it 
exhibits, neither is real, nor exists, nor is a fact, nor is. We 
should have to suppose him to be using all these four expres-
sions always as strict equivalents, and to mean that it is only 
in its other character that Time either exists, or is a fact, or is. 
And if he did mean this, there would, of course, be no doubt 
whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view 
with regard to Time ; since, of course, what most people mean 
by " Time " is what he chooses to call " Time in the character 
which it exhibits." Yet, his language, even in the passages that 
I quoted, seems to me to indicate that he does not mean this. 
I think, on the contrary, he means to affirm emphatically that 
Time even in the character which it exhibits, does exist, is a 
fact, and indubitably is, though it is not real, in that character. 
In the second passage, for instance, where he insists so 
emphatically that appearances do exist, are facts, and indubit-
ably are, he is, I think, plainly talking of appearances, in the 
character which they exhibit—or, as he there puts it, their 
nature, as it is—he does, I think, mean that appearances, even 
in this character, are facts, exist, and are, though, in this 
character, they are not " true of reality." And, so again in the 
third passage, where he says, Change is a fact, and this fact, as 
such, is not reconcilable with the Absolute; this language is 
surely quite inexcusable, unless he means that Change, as such 
—change, in the character which it exhibits—change, as it is, is 
a fact; though, of course, he holds that in this character it 
certainly is not real. I think, therefore, we have to assume 
that Mr. Bradley means to make a distinction not merely 
between Time, in one character, and Time in another, but also 
between " real," in one sense, and " real" in another. His 
meaning is not so simple as it would be, if he were merely 
making a distinction between Time in one character and Time 
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110 G. E. MOORE. 
in another, and it is not, after all, at all plain whether he means 
to contradict what ordinary people hold about Time or not. 
He does not mean to assert that Time, as such, neither is real, 
nor exists, nor is a fact, nor is; but, on the contrary, that Time, 
•even as such, does exist, is a fact, and is; but, nevertheless, is 
not real. This, at least, is what I am going to assume him to 
mean. And, on this assumption, we are brought face to face 
with the question as to the meaning of the word " real," and 
also as co the meaning of these other words "exists,'' "is a 
fact," and " is." Mr. Bradley seems to admit, we have seen, 
that " real" may sometimes be properly used as merely equivalent 
to these other phrases. We are, however, now supposing that he 
also holds that in another seuse they are not equivalent, but 
that " real" means something more than the others, so that it 
is quite consistent to maintain that Time is not " real," and 
that yet it does exist, is a fact, and is. In holding this I think 
he is mistaken; and what I want to do is to explain, as 
•clearly as I can, what sort of a mistake I take him to be 
making, and what seems to me to be the source of this mistake. 
I may, perhaps, be quite wrong in thinking that Mr. Bradley 
has made this mistake, and that it is in any degree the source 
of the distinction he seems to draw between " reality" and 
" existence." To maintain that it is so is no part of my main 
object. My main object is simply to make clear the nature of 
this particular mistake, whether committed by Mr. Bradley or 
not, and that it is a mistake ; because it seems to me that it is 
a mistake which it is very easy to make, and very important to 
avoid. I am, of course, not concerned at all to discuss the 
question whether Time is real or not, but only to discuss the 
question what sort of things would have to be true, if it 
were unreal, and whether if those things were true it could 
still be true that Time either exists, or is, or is a fact. 
Now, to begin with, I think I know pretty well, in part at 
least, what Mr. Bradley means when he says that it is unreal. 
I think that part at least of what he means is just what he 
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THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY. Ill 
ought to mean—just what anyone else would mean if he said 
that Time was unreal, and what any ordinary person would 
understand to be meant, if he heard those words. But I can 
•conceive that, when I have explained as well as I can what 
this is that he might to mean, some people may be inclined to 
dispute whether he means any such thing at all. They may say 
that he is using the word " real" exclusively in some highly 
unusual and special sense, so that in asserting that " Time is 
unreal" he is by no means denying any part of what ordinary 
people would mean by saying that " Time is real." And that 
some special sense may come in to his meaning I am prepared 
to admit. I do think it is possible that part of what Mr. Bradley 
is asserting may be something which no unsophisticated person 
would think of expressing in the same way, and I will admit, 
therefore, that he does not, very likely, mean by "Time is 
unreal" merely what other people would mean by this phrase, 
but something else as well. What, however, I cannot help 
thinking is that, even it' he means something more, he does mean 
what ordinary people would mean as well: that what they would 
mean is at least a part of his meaning. And if even this is 
disputed, if it is maintained that he is using the words 
•exclusively in some special sense, I own I do not know how to 
argue the question. If anybody really does take the view that, 
when he says "Time is unreal," absolutely all that he means is 
something which is kt no way incompatible with what most 
people would mean by saying " Time is real," I do not know 
how to show that this view is wrong. I can only say that if 
this had been all that he meant, I cannot believe that he 
would have expressed his view in the form " Time is unreal." 
The only further argument I shall bring in favour of my view 
that he does mean what he ought to mean will take the form of 
an answer to one possible argument which might be brought 
against it. When I have explained what he ought to mean by 
saying that " Time is unreal," it will be quite clear that this is 
something which is in fact incompatible with the truth of the 
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propositions that Time is, or exists, or is a fact. And it might be 
urged that the fact that it is thus incompatible is a strong 
argument against the view that Mr. Bradley does mean what 
he might to mean, since, if he had meant it, he could hardly 
have failed to perceive that what he meant was inconsistent 
with these propositions, whereas, as we have seen, he certainly 
does not perceive this. I have an answer to that argument, 
which consists in giving an explanation, which I think a 
plausible one, as to how he could come to think that the 
propositions are not inconsistent, when in ?• .ct they are. 
What, then, ought Mr. Bradley to mean by " Time is unreal" ? 
"What would most people mean by this proposition ? I do 
not think there is much difficulty in discovering what sort 
of thing they would mean by it. Of course, Time, with a 
big T, seems to be a highly abstract kind of entity, and to 
define exactly what can be meant by saying of an entity of that 
sort that it is unreal does seem to offer difficulties. But if you 
try to translate the proposition into the concrete, and to ask 
what it implies, there is, I think, very little doubt as to the sort 
of thing it implies. The moment you try. to do this, and to 
think what it really comes to, you at once begin thinking of a 
number of different kinds of propositions, all of which plainly 
must be untrue, if Time is unreal. If Time is unreal, then 
plainly nothing ever happens before or after anything else; 
nothing is ever simultaneous with anything else; it is never 
true that anything is past; never true that anything will happen 
in the future; never true that anything is happening now; and so 
on. You can at once think of a considerable number of kinds of 
propositions (and you could easily add to the list), the falsehood 
of all of which is plainly implied by saying that Time is unreal. 
And it is clear, also, that to say that the falsehood of all proposi-
tions of these kinds is implied is equivalent to saying that there 
are no facts of certain corresponding kinds—no facts which 
consist in one event happening before another; none which 
consist in an event being past or future, and so on. That is to 
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THE CONCEPTION OF KEALITY. 113 
say, what " Time is unreal" implies is that, in the case of a large 
number of different properties, which are such that, if they did 
belong to anything, what they belonged to would be facts 
having some common characteristic, which we might express 
by calling them " temporal facts," the properties in question do, 
in fact, belong to nothing. It implies that the property of 
being a fact which consists in one event following another 
belongs to nothing; that that of being a past event belongs to 
nothing, and so on. And why it implies that all those 
different special properties belong to nothing is, I think we 
may say, because what it means is that the general property 
which I have called that of being a " temporal fact" belongs to 
nothing. To say that the property of being a temporal fact 
belongs to nothing does imply that such special properties as 
that of being a fact which consists in one event following 
another, or that of being a fact which consists in something 
being past, also belong to nothing; in exactly the same way as to 
say that the property of being " coloured " belongs to nothing 
implies with regard to the special properties " being red," " being 
blue," etc., that they also belong to nothing. We may, then, I 
think, say that what " Time is unreal " means is simply "The 
property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing," or, to 
express this in the way in which it would be expressed in 
ordinary life, " There are no temporal facts." And this being 
so, we have explained the usage of "unreal," where it is 
predicated of Time with a capital T, by reference to a much 
more common and perfectly familiar usage of the term. The 
use of " is unreal" in the phrase " Time is unreal" has been 
defined by reference to its use in the phrase " Temporal facts 
are unreal." And its use in this phrase is, so far as I can see, 
exactly the same as in hosts of phrases with which we are 
perfectly familiar; it is, I think, the commonest and by far the 
most important use of the term " unreal." The use is that in 
which we use it when we say: " Unicorns are unreal," " Griffins 
are unreal," " Chimseras are unreal," and so on. I t is the usage 
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in which unreal is equivalent to " imaginary "; and in which to 
say " Unicorns are unreal" means the same as " There are no 
unicorns " or " Unicorns do not exist." In just the same way the 
proposition " Temporal facts are unreal," into which we have 
translated "Time is unreal," means the same as "There are 
no temporal facts," or " Temporal facts do not exist," or 
" Temporal facts are imaginary." 
I think, then, that what Mr. Bradley ov/jht to mean by 
" Time is unreal" can be defined by reference to one particular 
usage of the word "real"—or, if you like to put it that way, to 
one particular one among the conceptions for which the term 
" reality " may stand. And this particular conception seems to 
me to be by far the commonest and most important of those for 
which the term does stand. I want, therefore, before going on, 
to dwell a little upon its nature; although I daresay that all 
that I have to. say is perfectly familiar and perfectly well 
understood by every one here. Of course, it has often been 
said before, but I think it is still very far from being generally 
understood. 
I think, perhaps, the point I want to insist on can be brought 
out in this way. I have just said that we have pointed out 
one particular one, and that the most important, among the con-
ceptions for which the term " reality " may stand; and that is an 
excusable way of saying what we have done. But it would, I 
think, be more correct to say that we have pointed out one 
particular, and that the most important, usage of the terms 
" real" and " unreal," and that one of the peculiarities of this 
usage is that it is such that the terms " rea l " and "unreal" 
cannot, when used in this way, be properly said to stand for 
any conception whatever. I will try to explain what I mean. 
We have said that what " Lions are real" means is that some 
particular property or other—I will say, for the sake of brevity, 
the property of being a lion, though that is not strictly accurate, 
does in fact belong to something—that there are things which 
have it, or, to put it in anotlier way, that the conception of being 
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a lion is a conception which does apply to some things—that 
there are things which fall under it. And similarly what 
" Unicorns are unreal" means is that the property of being a 
unicorn belongs to nothing. Now, if this is so, then it seems to 
me, in a very important sense, " real" and " unreal" do not in 
this usage stand for any conceptions at all. The only conceptions 
which occur in the proposition " Lions are real" are, on this 
interpretation, plainly, (1) the conception of being a lion, and 
(2) the conception of belonging to something, and perfectly 
obviously " real" does not stand for either of these. In the 
case of the first that is obvious; but it is worth while pointing 
out that it is also true of the second. 
For if " is real " did stand for " belongs to something," then 
the proposition " Lions are real" would stand, not for the 
assertion that the property of " being a lion " belongs to some-
thing, but for the assertion that lions themselves are properties 
which belong to something ; and it is quite obvious that what we 
mean to assert is not any such nonsense as this. "Eeal," 
therefore, does not, in this proposition, stand for the conception 
of " belonging to something;" nor yet, quite plainly, does it 
stand for the conception of " being a lion." And hence, since 
these are the only two conceptions which do occur in the pro-
position, we may, I think, say that "real," in this usage, does 
not stand for any conception at all. . To say that it did would 
be to imply that it stood for some property of which we are 
asserting that everything which has the property of " being a 
lion" also has this other property. But we are not, in fact, 
asserting any such thing. We are not asserting of any property 
called " reality " that it belongs to lions, as in the proposition 
" Lions are mammalian " we are asserting of the property of 
" being a mammal" that it belongs to lions. The two proposi-
tions "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," though 
grammatically similar, are in reality of wholly different forms; 
and one difference between them may be expressed by saying 
that whereas " mammalian"' does stand for a property or 
H 2 
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conception, the very point of this usage of " real" is that it does 
not. 
To return to Mr. Bradley. " Time is unreal" ought to 
mean, according to me, " Temporal facts are unreal," in the 
sense I have tried to explain. And I cannot help thinking that 
this which he ought to mean is, in part at least, what Mr. 
Bradley does mean when he says " Time is unreal," though 
possibly he also means something else as well. But if so, it is 
quite clear, I think, that what he means is inconsistent with its 
being true that Time exists or that there is such a thing as 
Time. To say that Time exists or that there is such a thing, 
is to assert, at least, that there are some temporal facts: it 
may assert more than this, but it does assert this, at least, 
And this, we have seen, is exactly what is denied when it is 
said that Time is unreal. "Time is unreal" just means 
" Temporal facts are unreal," or " There are no temporal facts," 
or " Temporal facts do not exist." And just this is also what is 
meant by " Time dees not exist" or " There is no such thing as 
Time." There is, in fact, nothing else for these expressions to 
mean. What, therefore, Mr. Bradley ought to mean and 
(according to me) does mean by " Time is unreal" is, in fact, 
inconsistent with what he ought to mean by " Time exists " or 
by " Time is." And yet plainly he does not think that it is so. 
Is it possible to explain why he should have failed to perceive 
the inconsistency ? 
I think his failure can be explained as follows. I t 
may have been noticed that, in the passages I quoted 
from him, he insists, in one place, that to deny that appear-
ances exist is not merely false but self-contradictory, and in 
another appeals to the principle that " any deliverance of 
consciousness is but a deliverance of consciousness " in support 
of his contention that what is a fact need, nevertheless, not be 
real. And the fact that he does these two things does, I think, 
give colour to the suggestion that the reason why he thinks 
that what is unreal may yet exist, and be a fact, and be, is the 
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following. It is undoubtedly the case that, even if temporal facts 
are unreal, i.e., there are no such things, we can and do think of 
them, just as it is undoubtedly the case that, though unicorns 
are unreal, we can and do imagine them. In other words, 
" temporal facts" and " unicorns" are both quite certainly 
" deliverances of consciousness," at least in the sense that they 
are " objects of thought"; being " objects of thought" they are, 
in a wide sense, " appearances " also, and I cannot help thinking 
that Mr. Bradley supposes that, merely because they are so., 
they micst at least BE. " How " (I imagine he would ask) " can 
a thing ' appear' or even ' be thought of' unless it is there to 
appear and to be thought of ? To say that it appears or is 
thought of, and that yet there is no such thing, is plainly 
self-contradictory. A thing cannot have a property, unless it is 
there to have it, and, since unicorns and temporal facts do have 
the property of being thought of, there certainly must be such 
things. When I think of a unicorn, what I am thinking of is 
certainly not nothing; if it were nothing, then, when I think of 
a griffin, I should also be thinking of nothing, and there would 
be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking of a 
unicorn. But there certainly is a difference; and what can the 
difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of 
is a unicorn, and in the other a griffin '! And if a unicorn is 
what I am thinking of, then there certainly must be a unicorn, 
in spite of the fact that unicorns are unreal. In other words, 
though in one sense of the words there certainly are no unicorns 
—that sense, namely, in which to assert that there are would 
be equivalent to asserting that unicorns are real—yet there 
must be some other sense in which there are such things; since, 
if there were not, we could not think of them." 
Perhaps, it may be thought that the fallacy involved in this 
argument is too gross for it to be possible that Mr. Bradley 
should have been guilty of it. But there are other passages in 
Appearance and Reality—particularly what he says about 
Error—which look to me as if he certainly was guilty of it. I 
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suppose it will be quite obvious to every one here that it is a 
fallacy; that the fact that we can think of unicorns is not 
sufficient to prove that, in any sense at all, there are any 
unicorns. Yet, I am not sure that I know myself what is the 
mistake involved in thinking that it is sufficient, and I am going, 
therefore, to try to put as clearly as I can, what I think it is, in the 
hope that somebody may be able, if I am wrong, to correct me. 
The main mistake, I suppose, is the mistake of thinking that 
the proposition " Unicorns are thought of" is a proposition of 
the same form as " Lions are hunted "; or the proposition " I 
am thinking of a unicorn " of the same form as " I am hunting 
a lion "; or the proposition " Unicorns are objects of thought" 
of the same form as " Lions are objects of the chase." Of the 
second proposition in each of these three pairs, it is in fact the 
case that it could not be true unless there were lions—at least 
one. Each of them does, in fact, assert both with regard to a 
certain property—which we will call that of " being a lion "— 
that there are things which possess it, and also with regard to 
another—that of being hunted—that some of the things which 
possess the former possess this property too. But it is obvious 
enough to common sense that the same is by no means true of 
the first proposition in each pair, in spite of the fact that their 
grammatical expression shows no trace of the difference. I t is 
perfectly obvious that if I say " I am thinking of a unicorn," I 
am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that I am thinking 
of it, although, if I say " I am hunting a lion," I am saying both 
that there is a lion and that I am hunting it. In the former 
case, I am not asserting that the two properties of being a 
unicorn and of being thought of by me both belong to one and the 
same thing; whereas, in the latter case, I am asserting that the 
two properties of being a lion and of being hunted by me do 
belong to one and the same thing. I t is quite clear that there 
is in fact, this difference between the two propositions; although 
no trace of it appears in their verbal expression. And why we 
should use the same form of verbal expression to convey such 
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different meanings is more than I can say. I t seems to me 
very curious that language, in this, as in the other instance 
which we have just considered of "Lions are real" and "Lions are 
mammalian," should have grown up just as if it were expressly 
designed to mislead philosophers; and I do not know why it 
should have. Yet, it seems to me there is no doubt that in 
ever so many instances it has. Moreover, exactly what is meant 
by saying " I am thinking of a unicorn" is not by any means 
clear to me. I think we can assert at least this: In order that 
this proposition should be true, it is necessary (1) that I should 
be conceiving, with regard to a certain property, the hypothesis 
that there is something which possesses it, and (2) that the 
property in question should be such that, if anything did 
possess it, there would be a unicorn. Although this is 
plainly true, it does not give us completely what is meant by 
the statement, " I am thinking of a unicorn"; and I do not 
know what the'complete meaning is. I t is certainly not that 
I am conceiving with regard to the property of " being a 
unicorn," that there is something which possesses i t ; since I 
may be thinking of a unicorn, without ever having conceived 
the property of "being a unicorn" at all. "Whatever it does 
mean, the point which concerns us is that it is certainly not 
necessary for its truth, that the property of being a unicorn 
should, in fact, belong to anything whatever, or, therefore, that 
there should in any sense whatever be a unicorn. And the 
fallacy I am attributing to Mr. Bradley is that of supposing. 
that, in some sense, it must imply this latter. 
This, then, is what I imagine to be at least one of the 
reasons which have led Mr. Bradley to suppose that the pro-
position " Time is unreal" must be consistent with the proposi-
tion " There is such a thiDg as Time." Put shortly, it is that 
he sees (what is perfectly true) that " Time is unreal" must be 
consistent with " We do think of Time;" he thinks (falsely) 
that " We do think of Time" must imply, in some sense, 
" There is such a thing as Time ; " and, finally, infers (correctly) 
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from this true and this false premiss, that there must be some 
sense of the proposition " There is such a thing as Time " which 
is consistent with " Time is unreal." 
It follows, then, that if Mr. Bradley means what he ought 
to mean loth by " Time is unreal " and. by " Time exists," he is 
contradicting himself when he combines these two propositions. 
And I have said I feel convinced that he does mean what he 
ought to mean by the former. But I feel a good deal of doubt 
as to whether, all the same, he is contradicting himself, because 
it does seem to me doubtful whether he means what he ought 
to mean by the latter. The kind of thing which I imagine 
may be happening to him when he insists so strongly that 
Time does exist, is a fact, and is, is that, properly speaking, he 
is not attaching to these phrases any meaning whatever—not, 
therefore, that which they properly bear. It seems to me very 
possible that he has so strongly convinced himself of the false 
proposition that there must be some sense in which, if I think 
of a unicorn, there must be a unicorn, that wherever he knows 
the former proposition holds, he allows himself to use the 
latter form of words, without attaching any meaning to them. 
What he is really asserting so emphatically may, I think, be 
not anything which his words stand for, but simply this verbal 
proposition that there must be some sense in which they are 
true. 
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